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The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly: Quality
Inference in Federated Learning
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Abstract—Collaborative machine learning algorithms are de-
veloped both for efficiency reasons and to ensure the privacy
protection of sensitive data used for processing. Federated learn-
ing is the most popular of these methods, where 1) learning is
done locally, and 2) only a subset of the participants contribute in
each training round. Despite of no data is shared explicitly, recent
studies showed that models trained with FL could potentially still
leak some information.
In this paper we focus on the quality property of the datasets
and investigate whether the leaked information could be con-
nected to specific participants. Via a differential attack we analyze
the information leakage using a few simple metrics, and show
that reconstruction of the quality ordering among the training
participants’ datasets is possible. Our scoring rules are only using
an oracle access to a test dataset and no further background
information or computational power. We demonstrate two impli-
cations of such a quality ordering leakage: 1) we utilized it to
increase the accuracy of the model by weighting the participant’s
updates, and 2) using it to detect misbehaving participants.
Index Terms—Federated Learning; Inference Attack; Data
Quality
I. INTRODUCTION
Machine Learning (ML) has received much attention over
the last decades. For ML tasks, it is well known that more
training data will lead to a more accurate model. Unfor-
tunately, in reality, the data is scattered among different
entities, hence, data holders could potentially increase their
local model’s accuracy by training together a common model
with others [32]. Several methods were proposed in the
literature to tackle this problem. Probably the least privacy
friendly method is centralized learning, where a server pools
all participants’ data and trains the desired model. On the other
end of the privacy spectrum is multi-party computation [17],
a cryptographic technique which guarantee that only the final
model is revealed to legitimate collaborators and nothing more.
Neither of these extremes are acceptable for real-world use-
cases: while first requires participants to directly share their
datasets, the latter requires too much computational resource
to be a reasonable solution.
Somewhere between these (in terms of privacy protection) is
collaborative learning, where first the central node initializes
the model and broadcast it to all participants, than the fol-
lowing repeats until convergence: 1) the participants update
the model based on their training data and send it back to
the server 2) who averages the received updates to improve
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the global model and broadcasts it to the participants. Fed-
erated Learning (FL) [20], [36] is similar, which mitigates
the communication bottleneck of collaborative learning by
selecting a random subset of participants in each round
who calculates and sends their model updates instead of
all participants.
These methods provide some privacy protection by design
as the actual data never leaves the hardware located within
the participants’ premises. Yet, there are considerable amount
of literature that from these updates (i.e., gradients) a handful
of things can be learned about the underlying training dataset,
detailed in the related works.
Several techniques have been developed to conceal the
participants updates from the aggregator server, such as adding
pairwise noise to them [25], or using MPC [15], which could
eliminate the need for a central server in the first place.
These techniques protect the participants updates, while the
aggregated average enjoys no protection. Without a specific
background knowledge it is unlikely that in the collabora-
tive learning scenario an attacker could link the leaked
information with a specific participant as the aggregation
provides a ’hiding in the crowd’ type of protection.
A. Differential Attack
On the other hand, if the training is FL, where different
set of participants contributes in each round, via a differential
attack it is possible to tied to specific participants the
extracted information. This is especially important, as the
aggregated model is broadcasted to all participants, so besides
the aggregator server (if exists) this information is available
to everyone participating in FL, independently of any secure
aggregation protocol.
Example: In Table I we illustrate the differential attack for
Membership and Quality Inference attacks. In this example 6
participants train a word predictor model together where in
each round 3 randomly selected participant contributes. The
membership attack indicates the presence of a specific location
and email address in 1st round. Due to safe aggregation,
without any background knowledge it is not possible to single
out the participants who these data belongs to. The same attack
does not indicates the presence of the mail address in the
2nd round, hence, supposedly the mail address belong to F’s
dataset.1 The location does appear in the 2nd and 4th round
while it does not in the 3rd and 5th round, but so is both A and
1We assume within a round the participants train for an entire epoch, i.e.,
use all their data in the rounds they are selected.
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E, hence only after the 6th round can we connect the location
to E.
Round A B C D E F Location E-Mail Quality
1 A E F x x +
2 A B E x +
3 B C D -
4 A B E x +
5 C D F x -
6 B D E x
TABLE I
EXAMPLE FEDERATED LEARNING SCENARIO TO ILLUSTRATE OUR
DIFFERENTIAL ATTACK. PARTICIPANTS: A-F. LEAKED INFORMATION:
LOCATION→E, E-MAIL ADDRESS→F, HIGH/LOW QUALITY DATA→A/C
OR E/D.
Concerning the dataset qualities, within a specific round the
selected participants’ updates are hidden, but their aggregated
update is public. If a particular round improves the model
poorly (or significantly), it could be postulated that some of
the participants contributed in that round have low (or high)
quality data. By keeping track of such events, the participants
could be separated into low/medium/high quality data holders
with various confidence. In the example above, the 1st, 2nd,
and 4th round the model improved significantly (so either A or
E have high quality data as both participated in these rounds),
while in the 3rd and 5th round the model did not improved,
hence, either C or D have low quality data. Since the last round
is neither good nor bad, either both low and high quality data
is present or neither of them. Consequently, either A and C or
E and D has high and low quality data respectively.2
B. Contributions
In this paper we employ rigorous statistical analysis by
adopting a stochastic viewpoint of the updates, however, due to
the complexity of the task in hand, we turn towards empirical
evaluation. We utilize the information leakage from the
aggregated update when a safe aggregation mechanism
is in place, i.e., where the participant updates (i.e., individual
gradients) are hidden. We focus our attention on the honest-
but-curious attackers with limited power and resources, i.e.,
assuming the attacker can only eavesdrop, and it has no
background information (besides access to an evaluation
oracle) or any computation resource which would enable
her to do intricate calculations (concerning the attack). For
this reason, we do not consider any existing attacks, as
they all require either some computational resources (e.g.,
training shadow models [35], utilizing GANs [18], etc.) or
some background information (e.g., data distribution/subset
of the training sample [28], etc.).
Our novel attack aims to recover the quality of the ag-
gregated updates; consequently, the quality of the contributing
participants’ datasets. To obtain this quality information, we
take advantage of the inferred information across multiple
rounds’ aggregated updates and the subset of participants
associated with the corresponding aggregates. Of course, such
a quality measure is relative to the particular task and to the
other participants’ datasets, so we aim to retrieve a relative
2This is a hypothetical scenario, in real life no such a claims can be made
without longer observations of the round-wise improvements.
quality ordering of the participants (compared to each other
for the particular use-case).
The quality inference (i.e., relative quality ordering recon-
struction) attack works by evaluating the aggregated updates
in each round (based on a test dataset which is available for
all participants and easily obtainable for the server) and assign
scores to the contributors based on three simple rules called
The Good, The Bad, and The Ugly. These accumulated scores
(after many rounds) form a quality-wise ordering of the partic-
ipants. Although the inferred ordering is only partially correct
according to our experiments, it is successfully separates the
participants in less fine-grained quality bins such as low,
medium and high quality participants.
We run experiments on two architecture and two datasets
(we assume the pariticpants have IID dataset, which also
simplifies the simulation and the measurement of the dataset
qualities). We conclude that the quality inference accuracy
depends on the complexity of the FL task itself as well as
on the complexity of the model, which is being trained: with
more complexity comes higher quality inference. In the
most simple case (MNIST - MLP), our inferred quality
ordering is barely better than a random guess, while in
the most complex case (CIFAR - CNN), it is more than two
times (≈ 2.2) better than a random guess.
We consider two application of quality inference: misbe-
having detection and training efficiency boosting. Concerning
misbehaving we investigated two attacks: gradient inverting
and freeriding. While the first actively pulls back the learning,
the second is neutral to the learning process. This is reflected
in their detection rates as well: the detection rate is at least
twice as good as a random guess for both gradient inverting
participant after few rounds and for freerider after many
rounds. Concerning the training efficiency boosting we found
that weighting the participant’s contributions based on the
inferred quality scores improves more the accuracy of the
simple cases (> 1.1%) than of the complex ones (< 0.25%).
C. Organization
In section II we introduce the used variables through the
paper and the model the data quality leakage in FL. In section
III we describe how we simulate different datasets quality
and detail our three quality scoring rules. In section IV be-
sides elaborating on the experiments’ settings, we present our
quality inference metric and the base attack performance. In
section V we consider further increasing the quality inference
accuracy by parameter fine tuning. In section VI we dive
into the details of some possible applications of the inferred
dataset qualities. In section VII we discuss some possible
mechanism to mitigate quality inference leakage. In section
VIII we mention a handful of related works, while in section
IX we conclude the paper and mention some possible future
works.
II. THE THEORETIC MODEL
In this section we introduce the theoretical model of quality
inference and highlight its complexity.
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We note with n a participant in FL while N denotes the
number of all participants. Similarly, i denotes a round in FL,
while I denotes the number of all rounds. Si contains the
randomly selected participants for round i. b = |Si| capture
the number of selected participants. Dn is the nth participant
dataset, which consist of (x, y) ∈ Dn data-label pairs. A
summary of the variables in this paper are listed in Table III.
Variable Description
n ∈ [1, 2, . . . , N ] Participants
i ∈ [1, 2, . . . , I] Training rounds
Si Selected participants for round i
b Num. of selected participants
(x, y) ∈ Dn Participants n’s dataset
q(n) Par. nth inferred quality-wise position
qˆ Quality Inference’s accuracy
α Num. of cheating participants
r Num. of (last) observed positions
c Cheater detection rate
κ Weight updating rate
TABLE II
THE NOTATION USED IN THE PAPER.
We assume participant n is associated with a single
scalar quantity, measuring the quality of its dataset,
named un . Essentially, the quality of the aggregated gradients
(noted as vi for the ith round) form a linear equation system
Au = v, where u = [u1, . . . , uN ], v = [v1, . . . , vI ], and
an,i ∈ AN×I indicates whether participant n is selected for
round i. Depending on the dimensions of A, the system can
be under- or over-determined. In case I < N (i.e., no solution
exists) the problem and the solution is shown in Equation (1),
while if I > N (i.e., many solution exists) the problem and
the solution is shown in Equation (2) [33].
min
u
||v −Au||22 ⇒ u = (ATA)−1AT v (1)
min
u
||u||22 s.t. Au = v ⇒ u = AT (AAT )−1v (2)
The above equations do not take into account the random-
ness explicitly. Since the training is stochastic, we consider
the quality of the nth participant’s update (i.e., gradient)
as a random variable θn sampled from a distribution with
parameter un. Moreover, we can represent θn = un + en
where en correspond to a random variable sampled from
a distribution with zero mean. We can further assume
expected characteristic of the noise (i.e, error), namely that
en and en′ are IID for n 6= n′. As a result, we can express
vi =
∑
n an,iun + E for E sampled from the convolution of
the PDF of e.
In this case, due to the GaussMarkov theorem [16], the
solution in Equation (1) is the best linear unbiased estimator
(BLUE), with error ||v − Au||22 = vT (I − A(ATA)−1AT )v
(where I is the identity matrix) which expected value is
b(I − N). Note, that with more iteration, more information
is leaking, making the error less-and-less. However this is
not captured via the Gauss-Markov theorem as that considers
every round as new constraint. On the other hand, in our case
there is only
(
N
b
)
different constrains (with noise) which is the
number of possible rounds with different participants.
All-in-all, this problem is within estimation theory [24],
from which we already know that estimating a single random
variable with added noise is already hard, not even men-
tioning the fact that in our setting, we have multiple, forming
an equation system. Moreover, these random variables
are varying round-wise, which we were ingroring so far.
Nevertheless, in each iteration, a different contribution level is
expected, as the early iterations improve the model’s accuracy
greater than later one’s. Consequently, to estimate the dataset
qualities we must know the expected learning curve which
depends on exactly that. For this reason, we do not wish
to pursue this theoretical direction; instead, focus on the
empirical direction to break this circle.
III. QUALITY SCORING RULES
In this section we describe how we simulate different
datasets quality and detail our three quality scoring rules.
A. Quality Simulation
Data quality could mean several things; [3] defined 8 di-
mension of it (accuracy, completeness, redundancy, readability,
accessibility, consistency, usefulness, and trust), several having
its own subcategories. Even restricting ourselves to images
(used for the experiments), it spans over multiple dimensions.
Image quality is relative for two reasons: it can only be
considered in terms of the proposed use, and in relation to
other examples. Visual perception is a complex process; hence,
we do not manipulate the images themselves to simulate
different qualities. Rather, since we focus on supervised
machine learning, we modify the label y corresponding to
a specific image x.3
For our experiments, we assume the aggregator does have
a test dataset (e.g., a publicly available dataset) or at least a
query access to an evaluator oracle. Consequently, we split
the dataset randomly into N + 1 parts, representing the N
datasets of the participants and the test set used to determine
the quality of the aggregated updates. The splitting is done
in a way that the resulted datasets are IID, otherwise the
splitting would introduce some quality difference between the
participants. Since the participant’s datasets are from the
same underlying distribution, they quality is assumed to be
identical.4
To have a clear quality-wise ordering between the datasets,
we perturbed the labels of the participants differently: the N th
participant’s dataset is not pertubed, while the 1st participant’s
dataset is fully pertubed (i.e., all labels are randomized). Each
label for the rest of the participant’s datasets are randomized
with a linearly decreasing probability from 1 to 0. Mathemat-
ically this is described in Equation (3).
Pr(yk is randomized |(xk, yk) ∈ Dn) = N − n
N − 1 (3)
3Label perturbation [29], [30] could also be used to achieve differential
privacy [10], hence, in this case data quality could be interpreted as the noise
size or the privacy parameter.
4There can be slight variations due to the random splitting, however, we
run our experiments 10-fold, which mitigates this issue sufficiently.
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Assigning the qualities linearly following the participant IDs
does not introduce any bias in our experiments since both
the initial datasets splitting and the round-wise participant
selection are random.
B. Scoring Rules
Based on the round-wise improvements, we created three
fairly simple heuristic scoring rules to reward or punish the
participants. We name them The Good, The Bad, and The
Ugly, as the first one rewards the more useful contribution, the
second punishes the less useful ones, while the last punishes
when the contribution is just plain useless:
• The Good: all the participants who contribute in a round
which improve the model more than the previous round
receive +1 score.
• The Bad: all the participants who contribute in a round
which improve the model less than the following round
receive −1 score.
• The Ugly: all the participants who contribute in a round
which do not improve the model (i.e., decrease the
accuracy) will receive −1 score.
It is expected that consecutive rounds’ improvements are
decreasing: first the model improves rapidly, while in later
rounds it increases with a much lower pace. The first two
scoring rules (The Good and The Bad) captures the deviation
from this pattern: we can postulate that 1) high dataset quality
increase the improvement more than in the previous round,
and 2) low dataset quality decrease the improvement, which
would be compensated in the following round. Our last scoring
rules (The Ugly) assumes that if a particular round do not
improve the model, there is a higher chance that some of the
contributors’ dataset qualities are low.
Independently from the contributors dataset qualities, 1) the
round-wise improvements could deviate from this pattern due
to the stochastic nature of the learning, and 2) the improvement
could be negative after sufficient training rounds as the model
starts to overfit. We assume both of this affects all participants
evenly, so the relation between the scores are not significantly
affected by this ’noise’.
IV. MEASURING THE QUALITY INFERENCE
In this section besides elaborating on the experiments’
settings (i.e., which datasets and model structures are used
with what parameters) we present our quality inference metric
and the base attack performance.
A. Datasets & Models & Experiment Setup
For our experiments, we used the MNIST [6] and the CIFAR
[22] datasets. MNIST contains 70.000 hand-written digits in
a form of 28x28 gray-scale pictures, while CIFAR consist of
60.000 32x32 colour images of airplanes, automobiles, birds,
cats, deers, dogs, frogs, horses, ships, and trucks. For training
we use multi-layer preceptor (MLP) and convolutional neural
network (CNN) architecture. For MLP, we used a three-layered
structure with hidden layer size 64, while for CNN, we used
two convolutional layer with 10 and 20 kernels of size 5x5
followed by two fully connected hidden layer of sizes 120 and
84. For the optimizer we used SGD with learning rate 0.01
and drop out rate 0.5. In the rest of the paper, we will refer to
these four use-case as MM for MNIST-MLP, CM for CIFAR-
MLP, MC for MNIST-CNN, and CC for CIFAR-CNN. We
run every experiment 10-fold. The implementation could be
found at [31]. The exact parameters used for our experiments
are presented in Table III.
N b i α r
5 2 {10, 20, 30, 40, 50} {1} {1,2}
25 5 {10, 20, 30, 40, 50} {1, 2} {2, 4}
100 10 {50, 100, 150, 200, 250} {2, 4} {5, 10}
TABLE III
THE USED PARAMETERS FOR THE EXPERIMENTS.
The round-wise accumulated quality scores (averaged over
all use-cases, i.e., over MM, CM, MC, and CC) using all 3
rules for the 3 experiment (detailed in Table III) are presented
in Figure 1 where each participant’s dataset quality is degraded
proportionally to their ID (i.e., noise is added according to
Equation (3): 1’s dataset has the lowest, while N ’s has the
highest quality.)
Fig. 1. The average scores across the 4 use-cases (i.e., MM, CM, MC, and
CC) for each participant when N = 5, b = 2, i = {10, 20, 30, 40, 50} (top
left), N = 25, b = 5, i = {10, 20, 30, 40, 50} (top right) and N = 100, b =
10, i = {50, 100, 150, 200, 250} (bottom).
It is visible, that after a few rounds there is no significant
difference between participants’ quality scores with low and
high dataset quality (i.e., highest light-blue curve) for all
participants. On the other hand, the difference keeps growing
as the number of rounds grow, mostly by decreasing the
scores of the low ID participants (who correspond to low
dataset quality) more than the other participants. Note, that
even the N th participant (corresponding to the highest dataset
quality) quality score is decreasing with more rounds. This is
an expected characteristic of the scoring rules for two reasons:
1) as the model overfits, all participants’ quality scores will
decrease due to the The Ugly scoring rule, and 2) there is only
one rule increasing the score (The Good) while two decreasing
it (The Bad and The Ugly).
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It is visible that the three heuristic scoring rules combined
fairly well recovers the original dataset quality order of
the participants. As the number of participants grows, the
difference of the dataset qualities between the nth and the
n + 1th participant shrinks. Consequently, it is harder and
harder to correctly order them: it is unrealistic to recover
the exact quality ordering for more than a handful of
participants. On the other hand, our quality inference method
is suitable to give a high-level view (e.g., high/medium/high)
of the participants dataset qualities in relation to each other.
In turn, the difference of the dataset quality of two partic-
ipants with very different IDs are significant, so our heuristic
scoring rule is capable of differentiating the two: if we define 3
dataset quality classes (e.g., low, high and medium), we can
perfectly classify the lowest and highest dataset quality
participants. For instance, in case of N = 25 (N = 100)
participants the 8 (26) lowest dataset quality participants’ score
is always below -30 (-100), while the 11 (23) highest dataset
quality participant’s score is always above -20 (-80), so the
best and worst quarter of participants can be separated from
each other.
In Figure 2, we show the scores with N = 100 participants
for the four experiments (i.e., MM, CM, MC, CC) separately.
One can see that for simple models such as MLP, the quality
scores are less punctual than for more complex algorithms
such as CNN. It is also visible that the complexity of the task
(i.e., MNIST or CIFAR) only plays a minor role.
Fig. 2. The case-wise quality scores of each participant when N = 100 and
b = 10 for i = {50, 100, 150, 200, 250}.
B. Quantifying the Quality Inference
To quantify the inferred quality ordering of the participants,
we need to convert the relation between the quality scores
into a single value. For this purpose, we use the Spearman’s
distance dS [8], which measures the sum of the absolute
differences of all participants’ inferred (i.e., q(n)) and
correct position (i.e., n due to Equation (3)) in the quality
ordering. Note, that Spearman’s distance handles equally any
misalignment irrespective of the position. It is calculated
according to the left side of Equation (4).
dS =
N∑
n=1
||(n, q(n))||1 qˆ = 1− dSN2
2
(4)
Since dS depends on the number of participants, we have
to normalize it to have an uniform quality metric qˆ and
divide it with its maximum value which is N
2
2 (corresponding
to [1, 2, . . . , N ]→ [N, . . . , 2, 1]). Finally, we invert this value,
so it is within [0,1] where 1 represents perfect inference,
as shown on the right side of Equation (4).
The qˆ values averaged over the 4 use-case corresponding
to 5 and 25 participant (i.e., as in Figure 1) are {1, 1, 1, 1, 1}
and {0.77, 0.89, 0.87, 0.85, 0.85} for i = {10, 20, 30, 40, 50}
respectively. The qˆ values for 100 participants case-wise (i.e.
as in Figure 2) are presented in Figure 3.
Fig. 3. The case-wise quality inference performance when N = 100 and
b = 10 for i = {50, 100, 150, 200, 250}.
It is visible that for complex arhitecture (i.e., CNN) the
quality inference accuracy almost linearly grows in respect
to the rounds, while for simpler architecture (i.e., MLP) it is
rather decreasing. Note, that since the expected value of qˆ for
a random ordering is roughly N
2
3 [8], the baseline is qˆ = 0.3˙,
which we highlight on all figures with a square on the scale.
V. FINE-TUNING THE SCORING RULES
In this section we consider further increasing the quality
inference accuracy qˆ by parameter fine tuning. We vary the
thresholds which determines when to trigger which rule, we
measure the accuracy for different combinations of the rules,
consider ignoring the first few rounds, and use the actual
improvement difference as a score.
A. Threshold Optimization
Since the learning is stochastic, it is expected that partici-
pants with low (high) dataset quality by chance receive positive
(negative) scores in some rounds. To mitigate these effects, we
considered to use a threshold: for The Ugly, we score only if
the improvement is below some negative value (instead of 0).
In contrast, for The Good and The Bad we score only if the
improvement difference is above or below such a threshold
respectively.
In Figure 4 we show qˆ for all the use-cases with 100
participants after 250 rounds for each scoring rule separately
and accumulated. As the performance is similar for all the
considered threshold across all use-cases, we present the
average value as a line on a shorter scale on the right. The
Good performs the best with threshold t = 0.05, The Bad
with t = 0.15 and The Ugly with t = 0.15.5 The bottom right
5For The Ugly the threshold was considered to be negative.
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reflects the accuracy when all the scoring rules are combined,
which performes the best when t = 0.156.
Fig. 4. qˆ with various thresholds for N = 100, b = 10, and i = 250. The
left scale is for the columns, the right is for the average line.
B. Rule Combinations
Not surprisingly, the combination of all the scoring rules
outperforms all the single rules. This holds for all possible
combination as we show in Table IV below.
t = Good Bad Ugly G&B G&U B&U All
0.00 0.458 0.546 0.533 0.556 0.548 0.547 0.560
0.15 0.490 0.587 0.541 0.620 0.588 0.600 0.632
TABLE IV
THE AVERAGE qˆ SCORES FOR THE 4 USE-CASES WITH DIFFERENT
COMBINATIONS OF THE 3 SCORING RULE WHEN N = 100, b = 10,
i = 250 AND t = {0.00, 0.15}.
C. Improvement Value as Scores
Scoring the participants contribution with ±1 ignores the
actual accuracy changes: for example in case of The Ugly, it
does not matter how negative a round’s improvement is, the
corresponding participants receive −1 uniformly. Taking such
information into account might improve the quality inference
in our scoring rules, so we consider alternative rule variants
when the improvement values are used instead of ±1.
We compared qˆ using the actual improvement differences
(referred to as Value) within the 3 rules instead of essentially
counting by ±1 how many times the rules have been applied
(referred to as Count). Hence, we considered adding to the
participants scores the actual negative improvement in case
of The Ugly and the improvement differences in case of
The Good and The Bad with the previous and following
round respectively. As seen on Figure 5 (which show the
average qˆ over all use-cases corresponding to 100 participants
after 250 rounds), these results are inconsistent: qˆ improves
slightly for The Ugly, inconclusive in case of The Bad and
counterproductive in case of The Good.
6We set the thresholds separately for each scoring rule; however, the final
accuracy was not better than when we set it uniformly to t = 0.15, so we
only present this latter.
Fig. 5. The average qˆ over MM, CM, MC, and CC using the Count
and the Value as scoring rules for N = 100, b = 10, i = 250, and
t = {0, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25}.
D. Round Skipping
The above result is surprising, since by considering the
actual values instead of counting the events we do consider
more information in our scoring rules. We anticipate, this
is due to the learning curve: in the first few rounds the
improvement is so vast, the scores for the participants
selected in those rounds barely change afterwards as in
the succeeding rounds the improvements (i.e., scores) are
insignificant in magnitude compared to them.
Hence, we consider not scoring the participants during
the early rounds to mitigate this effect. We show the cor-
responding qˆ for both Count and Value when all 3 rules are
applied with and without threshold optimization in Table V.7
Ignore 0 2 4 6 8 10
Count t = 0 0.560 0.556 0.551 0.544 0.536 0.529
t = .15 0.632 0.640 0.632 0.628 0.628 0.616
Value t = 0 0.510 0.630 0.630 0.632 0.634 0.635
t = .15 0.509 0.625 0.631 0.638 0.640 0.634
TABLE V
qˆ FOR COUNT AND VALUE WITH t = {0.00, 0.15} WITH VARIOUS
AMOUNT OF FIRST ROUNDS SKIPPING FOR N = 100, b = 10 AND i = 250.
Several things are visible: concerning Value, skipping the
first 2 rounds improves qˆ considerably (51%→ 63%), while
later round skipping only corresponds to minor improvements.
Concerning Count, skipping is actually counter-productive,
as the scores are essentially normalized to ±1, so skipping
rounds only results in information loss. It is also visible that
parameter fine-tuning does not really effects Value, while for
Count it is non-negligible (56% → 63%). Finally, we can
conclude that neither is superior to the other, as the same
accuracy could be reached via Count with parameter tuning
and Value with iteration skipping.
Discussion
We started from 3 straightforward scoring rule, which, if
combined, achieved 0.36 for MM, 0.47 for CM, 0.72 for
MC, and 0.79 for CC without any parameter fine-tuning (i.e.,
without any background information). Note that the baseline
is 0.33, so in the simplest case (MM), qˆ is barely better than
a random guess. On the other hand, as the complexity of
the model and the task grows, so is the quality inference
performance qˆ: in the more complex cases (MC, CC), it is
more than two times better than a random guess. These values
could be improved to 0.46 for MM, 0.49 for CM, 0.80 for MC,
7t = 0.15 performs the best in case of Value as well.
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and 0.82 for CC via parameter tuning. Hence, fine-tuning
helps when the task is simple (i.e., MNIST) while it barely
improves in case of complex data/task (i.e., CIFAR).
Without fine-tuning on average qˆ performs +25% better
than the baseline 33%. Fine-tuning increase this further
with +7%. This extra 7% comes with a cost though: fine-
tuning the parameters is possible via shadow models [35],
which does require access to computational resources and
datasets (instead of only an evaluation oracle). Due to these
reasons in the rest of the paper we use the base Count
method.
VI. APPLICATION OF QI
In this section, we dive into the details of some possible
applications of the inferred dataset qualities. Although we
foresee many, we detail only two: misbehavior detection and
training efficiency boosting.
A. Catching Attackers & Freeriders
The leaking information about the participant’s dataset
quality could be used to isolate potential misbehaving. We
consider two kinds of deviation.
• Inverting: The participant’s goal is to worsen the quality
of the aggregated model actively. One was to achieve
this is to submit the additive inverse of the calculated
correct gradient.
• Freeride: The participant’s goal is to benefit from the
aggregated model passively. One was to achieve this is
not to calculate the correct gradients but instead submit
zero gradient.
We assume the rest of the participant’s datasets are of
equal quality; hence, we expect that the cheating participants
should be at the bottom of the inferred quality order. We
note the catching probability of the cheaters with c(r), which
depends on the number of the last observed positions r rather
than on the number of cheaters α. c(r) measures the fraction
of the cheaters who are isolated in the last r places of
the inferred quality ordering, i.e., the accuracy is shown
on Equation (5) where aj is the jth attacker and nr it the
participants with the rth lowest quality score.
c(r) =
#{aj | q(aj) ≤ q(nr)}αj=1
α
BaseLiner =
α∑
j=1
(
α
j
) · (N−αr−j )(
N
r
) · j
α
≈ r
N
(5)
The baseline (i.e., the value of c with random ordering)
is also shown above, which is independent of the number of
cheaters. For instance, c(10) = 0.8 means that 0.8 fraction of
the cheaters were in the last ten places (e.g., 4 in case of 5
cheaters). Obviously c(0) = 0 and c(N) = 1. The average c
values of the four use-cases based on the 10-fold experiments
with the settings defined in Table III are shown in Figure 6.
The first corresponds to N = 5 with α = 1, the second and
third to N = 25 with α = 1 and 2 respectively, while the
fourth and fifty corresponds to N = 100 with α = 2 and 4
respectively.
Fig. 6. The average c values of the 4 experiment (columns, left scale) and
the average and the highest position of the cheater (lines, right scale) for each
participant when N = 5, b = 2, r = {1, 2}, i = {10, 20, 30, 40, 50}, α =
1 (first), N = 25, b = 5, r = {2, 4}, i = {10, 20, 30, 40, 50}, α = 1
(second) and α = 1 (third), and N = 100, b = 10, r = {5, 10}, i =
{50, 100, 150, 200, 250}, α = 2 (fourth) and α = 4 (fifth).
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Although the baseline of c (which is highlighted with a
square on the scale with the corresponding color for both r)
does not depend on α, it is negatively effected by it: it gets
harder-and-harder to detect the cheaters when there are
more-and-more of them (i.e., see the difference between the
2nd and 3rd, and the 4th and 5th figure). It is visible that in
case of inverting after few rounds c already outperformed the
baseline. On the other hand, in case of freeride, c is not better
than a random guess after few rounds.
Not surprisingly, the detection gets more accurate when the
quality scores are based on more rounds. According to our
experiments, in case of inverting (which is obviously easier
to detect than freeride) c gets 3-4 times higher than the
baseline. Even for freeride the detection rate is still twice
as much.
These figures also showed the average and highest inferred
positions of the cheaters: as expected, the position decreases
with more rounds and increases with more cheaters. Note, that
the highest positions reached by a cheater were never in
the top 20% of the participants, even for freeride.
B. Boosting the Training
Based on the data quality, it is expected that both the
training speed and the obtained accuracy could be improved
when putting more emphasis on high-quality data. Hence, we
consider weighting the participant’s updates based on their
quality scores.
We adopt a multiplicative weight update approach [1],
which multiplies the weights (which are initially uniformly
1) with a fixed rate κ when any of the scoring mechanism
applies. This method is shown in Algorithm 1 where Si notes
selected participants for the ith round (declared in line 4),
and imp captures the round-wise improvements (declared in
line 8 using the accuracy Acc difference of the current and
previous model). The weights (w1, . . . , wN ) are updated in
the ith round with κ < 1 each time on of the three scoring
mechanism applies8 (line 10, 11, and 13 for The Good, The
Bad, and The Ugly respectively). For our experiments we
set κ = {1.00, 0.95, 0.90} where the first corresponds to the
baseline without participant weighting.
Concerning the size of κ, we observe that low dataset
quality participants’ weights are more sensitive than others:
a decrease in κ results in more weight drop for them. As
this is exactly the same effect what we already captured
in Figure 1 for quality scores in relation with the round
number, so we do not visualize our results here. Besides these
expected characteristics, we did not find any universal findings
in relation with the size of κ: neither higher nor lower rates
does consistently outperform the other, and the achieved
accuracy varies greatly primary on the used architecture and
secondly on the dataset.
One thing which is conclusive though is that using weights
based on our scoring rules improves the original accuracy
in most of the studied cases. We present our results (averaged
8We multiply with 1
κ
> 1 in case of The Good as that is a reward, not a
punishment.
Algorithm 1 On-the-fly participant weighting
1: Sb×I ; imp = [imp1, . . . , impI ]; W = [W1, . . . ,WN ]
2: W = [1, . . . , 1]
3: for i ∈ [1, . . . , I] do
4: Select b contributors (Si)
5: for c ∈ Si do
6: Update model (Modeli−1 →Modeli(c))
7: Aggregate (Modeli = Avg([Wc ·Modeli(c)]c∈Si))
8: impi = Acc(Modeli)−Acc(Modeli−1)
9: if impi > impi−1 then
10: for c ∈ Si do Wc =Wc · κ−1
11: for c ∈ Si−1 do Wc =Wc · κ
12: if impi < 0 then
13: for c ∈ Si do Wc =Wc · κ
over 10 executions) corresponding to the accuracy improve-
ment when κ = {0.95, 0.90} in Table VI for the four use-cases
and for the 3 experiment from Table III with i = {50, 50, 250}
respectively.
N = 5 N = 25 N = 100
κ 0.95 0.90 0.95 0.90 0.95 0.90
MNIST/MLP 1.70 2.56 3.80 1.62 2.93 1.15
CIFAR/MLP 0.19 0.36 0.99 1.24 1.32 1.02
MNIST/CNN 0.05 0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.02
CIFAR/CNN 0.13 0.24 -0.49 -0.32 -0.63 -0.49
TABLE VI
THE ACCURACY IMPROVEMENTS DUE TO THE MULTIPLICATIVE
WEIGHTING WITH κ = {0.95, 0.90} ON THE 4 EXPERIMENT WHEN
N = 5, b = 2, i = 50, N = 25, b = 5, i = 50 AND
N = 100, b = 10, i = 250.
These results are surprising and counter-intuitive: one
would expect more gain from the weighting when the
quality scoring captures the dataset qualities better (i.e., in
case of more complex model such as CNN). On the other hand,
precisely the opposite can be seen. While the quality infer-
ence performs consistently better on the most complex case
(i.e., CIFAR/CNN), the weighting barely or not improves the
accuracy (i.e., < 0.25%), while the highest improvement (i.e.,
> 1.1%) by weighting is achieved in the most straightforward
task (i.e., MNIST/MLP), where the quality inference is barely
better than the baseline random ordering.
VII. MITIGATION STRATEGIES
In this section, we discuss some possible mechanism to
mitigate against the quality inference. Note, that this leakage
is not intended, so this is a bug, rather than a feature in FL.
The simplest and most straight forward way to mitigate this
risk is to enforce all participant to contribute in each round.
However, this is not feasible for thousands of participants.
The leakage of the data’s quality inevitably present in the
aggregated updates. How often this information is available to
the participants plays a significant role in the success of the
QI attack, as Figure 1, 2, and 3 already demonstrated. Hence,
on way to mitigate this leakage is to decrease the access to
these updates. It can be done in many ways, for instance 1)
limiting the number of rounds by allowing the participants
to train multiple epochs within one round, or 2) instead of
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broadcasting the updated model, the server send it only to the
participants who are going to contribute in the next round.
Another technique is adaptive selection of the participants
for each round (instead of random), however this sword
has two edges: adaptive selection can be used to mitigate
the information leakage as well as increase it. Yet another
approach is to hide the participant’s IDs, so no-one knows
which participant collaborated in which round beside the
participants themselves. This can be achieved with various
techniques such as mix nets [5] and MPC [15].
Finally, the the aggregation itself could be done in a difer-
entially private manner as well, where a carefully calculated
noise is added to each round. Moreover client-level DP [13]
would by default hide the dataset quality of the participants,
although that require large volume of noise. On the other hand,
using the shuffle mode [2], [4] could solve this problem.
VIII. RELATED WORKS
In this section we enlist the related works, including but not
limited to well known privacy attacks against machine learning
and data quality.
Concerning freeriding, [11] deals with this problem in
peer-to-peer systems, and introduce the penalty mechanism,
which could be build on top of our scoring rules. A more
recent work [23] presents a freerider detection mechanisms
for collaborative learning which works only if no secure
aggregation is in place.
A. Privacy Attacks
There are several indirect threats concerning ML models.
According to a recent survey [27], these could be catego-
rized into model inversion or attribute inference (e.g., [12]),
membership inference and reconstruction attacks (e.g., [35],
[40]), (hyper)parameter inference (e.g. ([37], [38]), and prop-
erty inference (e.g., [26]). Our quality inference could be
considered as an instance of the last.
Another property inference attack is quantity composition
attack [39], which aim is to infer the proportion of training
labels among the participants in FL. The authors showed that
an attacker participating in the training (with minimal power)
could extract valuable information from training data without
requiring access to the individual updates. Consequently, the
attack is successful even with secure aggregation protocols
or under the protection of DP. Our setting is similar, as we
require even less knowledge and computational resource from
the attacker while allowing secure aggregation to be in place.
B. Privacy Defenses
As we simulate different dataset qualities with the amount
of added noise, essentially, what we want to prevent the
leakage of the added noise size. Consequently, this problem
also relates to the private privacy parameter selection, as
label perturbation [29], [30] (which is used to mimic different
dataset quality levels) is one of the 5 known techniques [27] to
achieve differential privacy (DP) [10], [7]. In previous works
the authors set the privacy parameter for DP using economic
incentives [19], [32] or offer the selection as a service [21].
We are not aware of any research (both within and outside DP
literature) which does consider to define the privacy parameter
itself also privately.
C. Data Quality
In this work we naively assumed the data quality is in a
direct relation with the added noise present in the data. This
served our purpose right, however, there is a computer science
discipline about data quality. For a comprehensive survey we
refer the reader to the book [3].
A complementary work is Data Shapley [14], which de-
termines the value of datasets used for FL. Originally
the Shapley value [34] was designed to allocate goods to
players proportionally to their contributions. The Shapley
value is the only fair payment rule, i.e., it satisfies the four
properties: efficiency (all the gain is distributed among the
players), symmetry (players with same contributions receive
the same payment), linearity (additivity of the Shapley value
between games) and null player (players contributing nothing
receive no payment). The main drawback of this payment
distribution is that it is computationally not feasible as it
requires exponentially more computations than the number
of participants. Moreover, besides this computational burden,
to calculate the Shapley values, one must have access to
all datasets. Although the first problem could be solved by
approximating the Shapley value via sampling [14], accessing
the datasets remains an issue. Consequently, our scoring
mechanism could be interpreted as an approximation of a
solution concept.
IX. CONCLUSION
Federated learning is the most popular collaborative learning
framework, wherein each round only a subset of participants
update a common model. In this paper, we devised three
quality scoring rules which could successfully recover the
relative ordering of the participant’s dataset qualities using
the size of the improvement of each training round. Our
method does neither require any computation power (such as
shadow models) nor any background information besides a
small dataset (or access to an evaluator oracle) in order to be
able to evaluate the improvement of the model accuracy after
each round.
Our results are twofold: first, we conclude that the quality
inference accuracy does depend on the complexity of the
model, which is being trained: with more complexity comes
higher quality inference accuracy (i.e., for a simple case it
is barely better than a random guess, while for more complex
ones it is more than twice of that). Second, paradoxically to the
first, weighting the participants based on the inferred quality
scores have a minor effect in the complex case while it
improves the final accuracy of the simple case consistently
with more than one percent.
Such a quality inference within federated learning could
have several applications. Besides the already mentioned
weighting, it could be used to identify freeriders and cheaters
of the supposedly commonly trained model. In this paper
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we also showed that catching such cheaters based on the
scoring rules is twice as effective as random guessing.
Future Work
The paper barely scratched the surface of a potentially
fruitful direction, namely the quality inference using aggre-
gated updates. Besides the already mentioned two directions
(misbehavior detection and participant weighting) there are
several other, such as approximating the Shapley value using
the introduced scoring rules. The privacy implications of
the this information leakage is also of interest: could such a
quality information be considered private?
The scoring rules themselves could also be a subject of
further research as they can be improved, replaced, weighted,
etc. Finally, the theoretical analysis of the quality inference
is an orthogonal direction to this empirical study: attempting
to reconstruct the dataset quality order is similar to the
problem studied in [9], which aims to reconstruct the entire
dataset based on query outputs.
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